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A REVIEW OF NIGERIA'S EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES SINCE
DEREGULATION IN 1986

SECTION 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION

A country's foreign exchange policy is derived from the perceived overall economic
objectives to be achieved and the expected direction of growth. Consequently,
non-conflicting sectoral policies are conceived within the ambit of the overall policy
framework such that each sectoral policy reinforces each other. Nigeria's economic
policy prior to 1986 was characterized by the overwhelming influence of oil and public
sector dominance of productive activities. While the stated objective of foreign
exchange policy continued to be the achievement of a healthy balance. of payments
position and the attainment of a stable exchange rate, monetary policies for instance
centered on the maintenance of price stability while fiscal policies emphasized a
non-inflationary tax base that would yield adequate revenue to government and ensure
fiscal discipline.
External sector polices during the period relied on foreign exchange allocation and
administered exchange rates, while monetary policy depended on price controls, credit
ceilings, selective credit controls, administered interest rates, prescription of cash
reserve requirements and other special deposits for realization of policy objectives.
Nigeria's fiscal operations were largely wide, unfocused and volatile, having systemic
negative effects on other sectors of the economy. Against this background, sectoral
objectives remained unrealized as the external sector reeled in continued deficit, the
exchange rate was volatile and depreciated at will in the autonomous market (which
exerted pressure on the official foreign exchange market), monetary policy targets
were continually missed due to inflationary financing of government deficits.
With the deregulation of the economy in 1986, a market-based framework for the
determination of exchange rate was adopted. It was envisaged that the realization of
macroeconomic stability would lead to the elimination of distortions in the external
sector and thus enhance growth, •stimulate non-oil exports, increase foreign exchange
inflows, moderate demand pressure in the foreign exchange market and generally,
improve foreign exchange utilization. The attainment of a rea~stic exchange rate was
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also expected to eliminate the parallel market premium, reduce capital flight as well as
enhance the inflow of foreign investments.
In pursuance of these objectives, a Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) was
adopted in September 1986 with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP). Since 1986, the outcome of exchange rate policies remained largely
unrealized. While the parallel market flourished, the exchange rate was far from realistic
and largely unstable and the external sector remained under severe pressure. In
consequence, other sectoral policies equally fared woefully as the targets of other
macroeconomic aggregates including interest rate, inflation rate, unemployment, money
supply etc, remain largely unrealized.
This paper seeks to address the reasons for the failure of foreign exchange policies in
Nigeria in achieving targets since 1986, and to adumbrate a likely path for policy. To
achieve this, the paper is structured into five sections. Following this introduction,
Section II reviews the growing literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime in a
developing oil exporting countries. Section ID examines the conduct and appropriateness
of Nigeria's foreign exchange policies in the 1990's, while Section IV appraises the
foreign exchange policies with a view to determining their efficacy. Section V
summaries and concludes the paper and proffers some policy suggestions.

SECTION II
2.0 CHOICE OF AN EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN A SMALL OPEN
ECONOMY
Every country has a wide array of exchange rate regimes to choose from depending on
the desired direction of economic policy, desired degree of flexibility of the exchange
rate regime and the nature of shocks faced by the economy. The goal of an exchange
rate regime is the optimization of output stabilization (Corden: 2002). Where the shocks
are predominantly external such as terms of trade shocks, necessitating changes in
relative prices, then flexibility in the exchange rate is most desirable because of its
capacity to facilitate adjustments in the real exchange rate. However, where the shocks
are mainly domestically induced through growth in monetary aggregates, a flexible
exchange rate would not be an ideal policy. A preferred option would be a fixed exchange
rate regime as money supply becomes an endogenous variable under a fixed exchange
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rate regime and triggers off an automatic adjustment mechanism that adjusts to the
shocks in money demand with minimal impact on growth (Celasun: 2003).
Where there is a labour market efficiency, the nominal exchange rate will adequately
address the real shocks to the economy. Where real wages are flexible and there is a
low pass through of changes in the nominal exchange rate to domestic price levels,
movement in the nominal exchange rate will translate into changes in real exchange
rate. Where wages are rigid and there is high mobility of labour between sectors and
across regions, the costs associated with exchange rate rigidity are quite high. Moreover,
a well-diversified economy lowers the cost of exchange rate rigidity as the associated
costs are more diversely distributed amongst the sectors of the economy, and a shock
to any one sector is insignificant to tilt the balance of overall output of the economy.
The degree of openness of an economy also significantly influences the choice of an
exchange rate regime. Thus, the less diversified an economic is, the more geographically
concentrated the trade, and the stronger the case for a fixed exchange rate regime,
(World Bank, 1997) and (Flood et.al, 1989). On the other hand, the more diversified an
economy is, the greater the openness of the economy, the better for the country to
adopt flexible exchange rate adjustment regime. Such regime reflects economic
fundamentals and aims at achieving a stable exchange rate. Barro and Sala-i-Martins
( 1995) argued that the degree of openness of an economy influences the level and rate
of economic growth. Thus, countries that are more open to international trade will
tend to grow more rapidly because they have developed a greater ability to absorb
technological advances and can take advantage of larger markets. To this extent, the
exchange rate regime influences the volume of international trade, which could in tum
have positive effect on growth. The literature suggests that the type of exchange rate
regime influences international trade; but it does not clearly predict which regime is
more likely to foster international trade. It has however been suggested that trade should
be higher under fixed regimes since exchange rate volatility and uncertainty will be
lower, which will tend to reduce the cost of trade and hence increases its volume,
Frankel and Rose (2002).
Hausman and Gavin (1996) have suggested that the terms of trade shocks are more
fundamental to output fluctuations in developing countries because of their reliance
on export of primary products. However, the choice of an exchange rate regime does
not provide an insurance cover against the vagaries of the terms of trade shocks.
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Consequently, negative terms of trade shocks, given a flexible exchange rate regime,
induce more than proportionate real depreciations and smaller losses in output growth,
while the reaction elicited under a fixed exchange rate regime is less than optimal
(Broda: 2001). Although net per capita GDP growth could be faster and GDP variability
higher under floating exchange rate regimes compared with fixed regimes, Ghosh,
Ostry, and Wolf (1996) found that both GDP growth and variability are faster and lower,
respectively, under intermediate regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2002) using
cross-country regressions, indicate that for most developing countries, greater exchange
rate flexibility is strongly associated with higher growth and less output volatility.
Celasun (2003) has shown that for oil based economy; terms of trade and output volatility
were often of significant consideration. For these economies, oil price increases often
result in booms of domestic consumption, increased capital inflows and investment,
and real exchange rate appreciations that are harmful for the development of the
non-recourse sectors, as predicted by the Dutch Disease hypothesis. Conversely, a fall
in oil prices has the opposite effect. Overall, oil price volatility makes revenues largely
unpredictable and exchange rate volatility holds sway. However, these volatilities can
be addressed through fiscal policies that smoothen domestic demand over time, thereby
enabling the exchange rate play a supporting role of facilitating rapid real exchange
rate adjustment.
Although the flexible exchange rate has a number of advantages including output
stabilization that should ordinarily endear it over the fixed exchange rate regime,
exchange rate pegs are rather common amongst small open economies because of the
pass-through effects of exchange rate movements into domestic prices, issues
bordering on credibility, and the associated risks of unhedged foreign currency liabilities
given incessant exchange rate volatility. The thinness of the foreign exchange markets
in developing countries makes the likelihood of excessive volatility eminent, while
the shallowness of the financial markets creates a dearth of hedging instruments against
exchange rate risks.
The choice of a ruling exchange rate regime therefore becomes a matter of conjecture
of the monetary authorities of their perceived trade-off between the desire to dampen
exchange rate volatility and the control of inflation using the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor, and to moderate fluctuation in output through using the nominal exchange rate
as a shock absorber. This tradeoff as perceived by the authorities should normally be
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the basis for the selection of an exchange rate regime. Again, a country's economic
structure and institutional characteristics are taken into account in the choice of exchange
rate policy. In most developing economies, a major consideration in choosing an
exchange rate regime would be the effect of various shocks on the domestic economy.
This is because the adoption of a particular exchange rate regime and the related foreign
exchange regulations has considerable influence on the development and structure of
the foreign exchange market. Developing countries are more susceptible to adverse
effects of exchange rate volatility on trade and inflation, unlike developed countries
that have well-developed financial markets, which makes it much easier for them to
adopt any of the regimes. Empirical studies have shown that small open economies are
better off with fixed exchange rate regime as this helps to maximize the use of resources
and minimize the cost of transactions and control inflation.
Ghosh et. al (1997) classified exchange rate arrangements into three: pegged,
intermediate and floating regimes. The pegged regimes include single currency pegs,
Special Drawing Right (SDR) pegs, published basket and secret basket pegs. The
intermediate consists of unclassified floats or floats with predetermined ranges, while
the floats group comprise floats without predetermined range and pure floats. They
showed that countries with intermediate flexibility had better growth performance
compared to those that were pegged and floated. In terms of inflation performance,
countries with pegged exchange rates record low inflation, while those with floating
rates experience high inflation. Not surprisingly, countries with floating rates had
considerably higher monetary growth compare to those with fixed and intermediate
regimes. Moreover, countries that pegged and adopted intermediate exchange rate
arrangements exhibited noticeably better fiscal discipline compared to those that
adopted floating rates. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes appeared to have
higher current account deficits compared to those adopting intermediate floating
regimes. Similarly, these countries had higher ratios of reserves to base money than
those with floating exchange regime. Countries with floating regimes clearly experience
the highest budget deficit compared to those operating under fixed and intermediate
regimes. However, the relatively poor fiscal performance of countries with flexible
regimes was attributable to weak revenue collection and excessive spending.
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1996) noted that the
failure to identify a relationship between the exchange rate regime and economic growth
could be the result of measurement error in the classification of exchange rate
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arrangements. Growth theories and the literature on exchange rate regimes suggest
that the type of exchange rate regimes adopted by a country could have consequences
for its medium term growth, directly through its effects on adjustment to shocks and
indirectly through its impact on other macroeconomic determinants of growth such as
investment, international trade and financial sector. However, both theory and the
licerature are silent on the recommended exchange rate regime that would initiate,
promote and sustain economic growth.
Bailliu, Lafrance and Renault (2001) in their study of twenty five emerging market
economies uncovered evidence suggesting that more flexible exchange rate
arrangements are associated with higher economic growth but only for countries that
are relatively open to international capital flows and to a lesser extent, that have well
developed financial markets. Similarly, levy, Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2001) found
that less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth in developing
,-countries. It has been argued that a more flexible arrangement may foster higher growth
since it will enable an economy characterized by nominal rigidities to absorb and adapt
to economic shocks more easily because exchange rate movement can act as a shock
absorber.
Aizenman (1994) has argued that exchange rate regimes can influence economic growth
through their effects on the rate of physical capital accumulation. This position finds
supports in Edwards (1993) who argues that investment will tend to be higher under a
fixed exchange rate regime as a result of a reduction in policy uncertainties, real interest ·
rates and exchange rates variability. An exchange rate regime could therefore influence
growth through its effect on the level of development of financial markets.
Flexible exchange rate arrangements are generally associated with increased nominal
exchange rate volatility, which could have damaging effects on the real economy unless
the financial sector can absorb the associated exchange rate shocks and provide agents
with appropriate hedging instrument. It is sometimes argued that an economy must
have reasonably a well-developed domestic financial system for it to benefit from a
flexible exchange rate regime. Thus, Bordo and Flandrean (2001) find evidence for the
post-Bretton Woods period that suggests that countries with more developed financial
systems tend to have floating exchange rate regimes. Many emerging market economies
have shallow capital markets and hence find it difficult to manage a flexible exchange
rate regime. Aizenman and Hausmann (2000) argued that the combination of an
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undeveloped financial sector and a fixed exchange rate regime could be problematic
because it could precipitate a banking crisis.
Country experiences have shown that the inconsistency between economic and financial
policies and the prevailing exchange rate regime were the key factors in most crisis
cases examined. Other contributory factors include the weakness in the condition and
supervision of the banking system and inappropriate fiscal policies as well as the lack
of progress in crucial structural reforms. Mundell (1968) and McKinnon (1971)
suggested that since exchange rate policy is an integral element of monetary policy, it
should reflect the thrust of monetary policy in their objectives. Thus, the pursuit of an
appropriate exchange rate policy blended with complimentary monetary and fiscal
policies will help to ensure better economic performance.

SECTION Ill

3.0 NIGERIA'S EXHANGE RATE POLICIES SINCE DEREGULATION

IN 1986
Since the departure from an administratively determined fixed to a market based flexible
exchange rate regime, the modalities for operating the foreign exchange market in
Nigeria have been continuously fine-tuned to reflect the exigencies of the time and
policy objectives of the monetary authorities. This section discusses the framework
used for exchange rate determination and management between 1986 and 2000, with a
view to bringing to limelight the thinking that gingered the authorities into taking the
decision at that time.

3.1 The Dual Exchange Rate System (September 1986 - April 1987)
The Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), was introduced in September, 1986
as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) adopted to deregulate the
economy, eliminate inefficiency in public sector productivity and ensure a steady growth
path for the economy. Under the SFEM, the Central Bank intervened in the foreign
exchange market on a weekly basis to sell foreign exchange to end-users. The first-tier
exchange rate, which was fixed administratively, was also allowed for official
transactions such as debt service payments, embassy expenses, subscriptions to
international organizations, etc, while the second-tier rate was determined by auction.
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The average rate pricing method was initially adopted to determine the exchange rate
but it was later substituted with the marginal pricing system in order to achieve a stable
and realistic exchange rate. The system led to spurious and multiple bidding by authorized
dealers, thereby discrediting it as the objective of emergence of a realistic exchange
rate for the naira became frustrated.

3.2 The Dutch-Auction System (April 1987 - July 1987)
To ensure professionalism in bidding, and to curb the propensity of high bids, the Dutch
Auction System (DAS) was introduced in April 1987 under which the frequency of
bidding was reduced from weekly to fortnightly. Under the system, the exchange rate
was determined by auction where authorized dealers pay according to their bid rates.
The ruling rate is the marginal rate, which clears the market. The CBN determines the
amount of foreign exchange it can afford to sell at a price consumers are willing to pay
at the auction. The DAS was hitherto abandoned because of teething problems associated
with the deregulation of the foreign exchange market at its debut. Efforts made at
fine-tuning the operational modalities failed to evolve a realistic exchange rate largely
as a result of substantial growth in liquidity over the period.

3.3 The Unified Exchange Rate System (July 1987 - March S1h, 1992)
In July 1987, the dual exchange rate system was jettisoned as the first and second-tier
foreign exchange segments were merged into an enlarged Foreign Exchange Market
(FEM) with a unified rate. Thus, the inherent subsidy on first-tier transactions was
removed. The merger increased demand pressure and contributed significantly to a
massive depreciation in exchange rate. This was attributed to the expansionary fiscal
policies pursued by the government.

3.4 The Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM): 1988
An autonomous market for foreign exchange, where banks sold foreign exchange
amongst themselves was introduced in 1988. This was initiated to encourage the inflow
of non-oil foreign exchange earnings to banks; thereby relieving the pressure on the
CBN for the official allocation of foreign exchange. The autonomous market rates
depreciated sharply and encouraged rent-seeking activities, while the official rate
became unrealistic thus building demand pressure on the CBN. From 1986 to date
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when the foreign exchange market was deregulated, foreign exchange became a hard
sought after commodity, as the parallel market flourished with widening arbitrage
premium with the official rate.

3.5 Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM): 1989
The unsustainable position of the demand for foreign exchange under the AFEM led to
the introduction of the IFEM in January 1989. The IFEM was to be funded by the
authorized dealers in foreign exchange, with the CBN being a participant and intervening
only when necessary. Thus, the monetary authorities hoped to broaden the supply base
and deepen the foreign exchange market with a view to achieving a realistic exchange
rate for the naira. Contrary to expectations, the CBN remained the major supplier of
foreign exchange, meeting all demand by the authorized dealers. Generally, the IFEM
was characterized by unbridled demand pressure on available foreign exchange,
misalignment of the naira exchange rate, evidenced by the existence of a wide arbitrage
premium between the official and parallel segments of the market, the emergence of
multiple exchange rates in the market, and the emergence of an army of foreign exchange
speculators and arbitrageurs. The combination of these factors frustrated the envisaged
emergence of a realistic exchange rate as the naira experienced high volatility, thereby
necessitating a policy change.

3.6 The Dutch Auction System (DAS): 1990
To address the problem of submission of multiple bids and foreign exchange hoarding,
the CBN modified the inter-bank procedures in December 1990 with the reintroduction
of the DAS. As a complementary measure, Bureau de Change (BDC's) were established
to cater for foreign exchange requirements of small users and at the same time, broaden
the scope of legitimate foreign exchange transactions, improve fiscal efficiency and
compete favorably with the parallel market with a view to absorbing the informal market.
In spite of this effort, the exchange rate continued to depreciate.

3.7 Completely Deregulated Exchange Rate System (March 5, 1992-1994)
As a result of the persistent instability in the foreign exchange market, (e.g. the rise in
the parallel market premium from 20.0 per cent in 1990 and 35.5 per cent in 1991 to
79.2 per cent in February 1992), the CBN adopted a completely deregulated system of
foreign exchange trading on March 5, 1992. Under the system, the CBN supplied in
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full, all requests for foreign exchange by authorized dealers. Its adoption was aimed at
narrowing the parallel market premium and fostering the operational efficiency of the
foreign exchange market. In pursuance of this objective, the CBN adjusted its rates
upward from Nl0.5564 per $1 for Nl8.0 per dollar the next day and ensured that it
satisfied all the demand for foreign exchange by authorized dealers. Initially, the parallel
market premium narrowed to a level below 10.0 per cent, while effective demand by
banks also fell short of the supply. As a result of renewed demand pressures and
speculative activities, the parallel market premium started to widen again. Thus, the
official exchange rate was fixed at N21.9960 per dollar for most of 1993, while
allocation of foreign exchange was made on a pro-rata basis. There was a noticeable
divergence in rates between the official and parallel market and Bureaux de Change
(BDC) due to the continued pressure on the exchange rate. This development dictated
the policy stance in 1994. In complement, the BDC's were insulated from selling foreign
exchange, and all foreign receipts were centralized in the CBN.

3.8 Fixed Exchange Rate System: 1994
In response to the existence of the wide arbitrage premium between the official and
parallel market, the government in 1994 undertook a fundamental reform of the market
by introducing a fixed exchange rate regime. It was formally pegged at N21.9960 per
dollar and the pro-rata system of allocating foreign exchange was sustained. The general
thrust of exchange rate policy in 1994 was to instill sanity into the foreign exchange
market, encourage activities in the productive sectors of the economy and strengthen
the BOP position. However, the re-regulation of the economy in 1994 further reduced
the value of the naira and widened the premium in the parallel market. At the end of
1994, the parallel market premium rose to over 350.0 per cent, which was highly
disturbing. Thus, measures put in place to manage foreign exchange in 1994 failed to
address the crucial issues of improving foreign exchange receipt through raising the
level of non- oil exports and enhanced capital inflow.
Other complementary policy measures introduced included the setting up of a foreign
exchange allocation committee comprising representatives of the CBN, the Federal
Government and the organized private sector. The committee was charged with the
responsibility of ensuring that foreign exchange was available to end users in the priority
sectors of the economy, agriculture, manufacturing finished goods and services on
agreed percentages.
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3.9 Re-introduction of Dual Exchange Rate Regime (1994-January 1999)
The dismal performance of the economy in 1994 especially, the rising rate of inflation
led to a reversal of the policy stance of the government in 1995. Consequently, the
policy of dual exchange rate was reintroduced. In order to stem the negative
developments in the foreign exchange market and achieve efficient allocation and
utilization of the scarce foreign exchange resource, AFEM was introduced to
complement the fixed exchange rate. Thus, the official exchange rate at N21.9960 per
dollar was used for public use, including debt service payments and National Priority
projects, while the exchange rate in AFEM was determined through market forces. The
policy also allowed the CBN to intervene in the market with a view to stabilizing the
rate, while the BDC were allowed to trade in autonomous fund having granted them
concession to buy and sell travelers cheques against their previous status as authorized
buyers only in 1994.
Other measures introduced to complement the existing policy aimed at ensuring the
smooth functioning of the AFEM were the abrogation of the Exchange Control Act of
1962 and the Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1989. Exporters were allowed to sell
their export proceeds at autonomous rates to any bank of their choice. Against this
background, the supply of foreign exchange improved from both official and
autonomous sources, while parallel market premium narrowed. Overall, the 1995 policy
measures were retained in 1996, while in 1997, current account transactions were
further liberalized resulting in the removal of limits on Basic and Personal Travel
Allowances and remittances for educational instructions abroad. All these efforts failed
to reduce the incidence of round tripping and eliminate distortions created by the
subsidized rate at the official market. Thus, the fixed exchange rate for official
transactions was abolished in January 1999, while AFEM remained the unitary exchange
rate until October 25, 1999 when the IFEM was re-introduced.

3.10 Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM)(October 1999-July 2002)
The IFEM was a system conceived to broaden and deepen the supply of foreign exchange
to the market by allowing the oil companies and authorized dealers to buy and sell. The
trading was conducted daily, while the CBN either intervenes as a buyer or seller
depending on how it perceived the market. It was however envisaged that the new
exchange rate policy would help to reduce speculative bubbles and enhance transparency
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in the foreign exchange market. Instead, it worsened the demand pressure at the IFEM
and rendered the CBN as a sole supplier in the market. There were observed cases of
round tripping of funds from the official to the parallel market.

3.11 Dutch Auction System (DAS) (July 22, 2002 till Date)
The DAS of foreign exchange management was first introduced in 1987, jettisoned
and reintroduced in 1990-1991, as a system, which recognizes the scarcity of foreign
exchange and discourages implicit or explicit subsidy on the commodity. The reasons
for its reintroduction was to conserve external reserves, narrow the premium between
the official and parallel market rateS', and achieve a realistic exchange rate for the
naira. At the inception of the DAS, the external reserves, which stood at US$10 billion
at end-December 2001, had already depleted to US$8 billion. This level could finance
7.7 months of foreign exchange disbursements at this time. Since its re-introduction,
the exchange rate has been relatively stable and the degree of misalignment in exchange
rate has been narrowed. So far, DAS has helped to instill some degree of discipline
into the market and restore stability in the exchange rate of the naira.
3.12 Development in the Foreign Exchange Market
Exchange Rate Movements
The change from administrative fiat towards the reliance on market forces for the
determination of the exchange rate resulted in the depreciation of the naira against the
major trading currencies. Available data indicated that average annual exchange rate
which was N2.0=$1 in the official market in 1986 depreciated rapidly to between
N4.0=$1 and N9.9=$1 in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Following the devaluation of
the naira in 1992, the rate averaged N17.3=$1 for that year and further depreciated to
N22.1=$1 in 1993. The re-regulation policy of 1994 appreciated the rate for the first
time since 1986 to N21.9=$1. However, with the adoption of AFEM, the naira sharply
resumed its downward movement culminating in N82.3= $1. There was relative stability,
thereafter, as the naira exchanged at N81.5=$1, N82.0=$1, N84.4=$1 for 1996, 1997
and 1998, respectively. From N92.7=$1 in 1999, the naira further depreciated to
N121.0=$1 in 2002. During the same period, the parallel market rate also depreciated
to Nl0.6=$1 in 1989 and converged with the bureau de change rate at N9.6=$1 in
1990. Since then, the two rates not only moved in the same direction, but remained
very close. The rates actually converged again at N85.0=$1 and Nlll.1 =$1 in 1997
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and 2000, respectively. Thereafter, the parallel market and bureaux de change rates
depreciated by 18.3 and 13.1 per cent, respectively in 2001 and 2002 (Table 1, chart I).

Chart 1
Exchange Rate Movement
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3.13 Trends in Demand and Supply of Foreign Exchange

Efforts at managing the demand for foreign exchange have yielded mixed results. From
1986 to 1998, demand remained fairly within the range of supply as average deviation
was 8.0 percent. However, the year 1989 witnessed the phenomenon of excessive
demand pressure in the foreign exchange market as US$17 .3 billion was demanded
compared with the supply of US$2.5 billion. This was despite policy initiatives to
deepen the market through the introduction of Bureaux de Change and Inter-Bank
Foreign Exchange transactions. The trend continued in 1990 when demand increased
further to US$20.2 billion with supply almost stagnating at US$2.5,.billion, indicating
a shortfall of US$17.7 billion or 87.6 per cent. Thereafter, demand pressure eased
significantly to US$9.5 and US$6.4 billion for 1991 and 1992, respectively, as against
supply levels ofUS$6.5 and US$2.4 billion. In 1993, demand peaked at US$40.6 billion,
reflecting the growth rate of M 2 at 49.8 per cent, which was the highest in the period
under review, but moderated to US$35.7 billion in 1994. On the other hand, shortfalls
in supply were 92.9 and 94.5 per cent in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
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Consequent upon the abolition of the pegged exchange rate of N21.99=US$1 , demand
fell sharply to US$1. 7 billion 1995 and almost stabilized a year later, growing marginally
by 3.6 per cent. However, it resumed an upward trend in 1997, rising steadily to US$9.7
billion in 2001 before declining to US$8.0 billion in 2002 as a result of the
re-introduction of DAS in July of that year. The excessive demand pressure in the
foreign exchange market was attributed largely to the expansionary fiscal operations
of the government as evidenced by the low demand levels between 1995 and 1997
when growth in M 2 was rnined in within target. Other contributory factors included
speculative activities by market operators in a bid to take advantage of the parallel
market premium as well as the lack of confidence in the ability of the CBN to meet
their needs always (Table 2, chart II).

Chart II
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SECTION IV
4.0 APPRAISAL OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY MEASURES
The goals of achieving a realistic and stable exchange rate of the naira has remained
largely unattained since 1986, so also the desired reduction in excess demand for
foreign exchange, elimination of distortions in the economy thereby enhancing growth,
stimulation of non-oil exports, enhancing efficiency in the allocation process, and
improving the balance of payments position. The attainment of the core objective of a
realistic exchange rate was also expected to reduce capital flight as well as enhance the
flow of foreign investments. This appraisal would be undertaken against the backdrop
of these objectives.

4.1 Realistic and Stable Exchange Rate
The stability or otherwise of the exchange rate of a currency is usually referred to in
the context of its periodic movements in relation to the trend in the equilibrium
exchange rate. As economic fundamentals, which significantly influence exchange rate,
are dynamic, some degree of variation in exchange rate from the equilibrium is tolerable
and regarded as normal. However, there is no consensus on what should constitute
'normal'. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) operated a system of par values for
its members at plus or minus 2.25 per cent between 1971 and 1973. Similarly, the
European Community (before full monetary union) adopted a plus or minus 10.0 per
cent.
Table 4 shows the annual changes in the exchange rate of the naira. On the basis of the
IMF band, the naira could only be described as stable in 1994 and between 1996 and
1998. But based on the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) benchmark, 1990 and the
years 1999 through 2002 would be included as periods where the naira achieved stability
(see chart ID).
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Chart Ill
Variation in Official Exchange Rate
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There are difficulties associated with practical determination of realistic exchange
rate and are largely due to conceptual and measurement problems. Nevertheless, the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) can be relied upon to provide a guide on the level of
exchange rate that could be considered realistic. A comparison between the observed
nominal exchange rate and computed rates based on the PPP approach indicated
significant variations ranging from 3.9 per cent in 1986 to 3.7 per cent in 1992. Indeed,
it was only in 1995 that the two rates converged at N82.3 to the dollar (table 4). Thus,
it could be concluded that based on the computed PPP for the naira, the exchange rate
had been unrealistic for most of the period under consideration (chart IV).
Chart IV
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These developments in the foreign market do not indicate that realistic and stable
exchange rate objective has been achieved. The volatility observed in the naira exchange
rate can be attributed to the following factors; excess demand for foreign exchange,
speculative activities and sharp practices by authorized dealers, expansionary monetary
and fiscal policies as well as frequent policy changes.

4.2 Demand/Supply Gap
Analysis of demand and supply of foreign exchange to the foreign exchange market
showed that demand exceeded supply in the period 1987-1994 with adverse implications
for exchange rate stability. Table 2 shows that demand/supply gaps were most
pronounced during 1989-1990 and 1993-1994 where differences between demand
and supply stood at 87 .6 and 94.5 per cent, respectively. The huge demand/supply gap
reflected the production structure of the economy, which is mainly dependent on
imported raw materials. Data on sectoral utilization of foreign exchange revealed that
the share of raw materials in industrial sector imports over the last five years has
remained consistently high at 62.3, 62.4, 66.2, 62.4 and 58.1 per cent for 1998, 1999,
2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively. Furthermore, the domestic i~dustries were yet to
re-orientate their production away from import substitution and produce for the export
market. Consequently, they have remained consumers of foreign exchange and
compromised the benefits derivable to the economy in terms of expanding the supply
base, which would have ·eased the demand pressure. Meanwhile, there has been
concomitant increase in the demand for foreign exchange for the importation of finished
goods, which accounted for 27 .8 per cent of total imports in the last five years. These
developments combined with the poor performances of the non-oil sector have sustained
demand pressure in the foreign exchange market.
There is no doubt, however, that some of these demands were merely speculative in
nature due partly to confidence crises of market operators in their perception of the
ability of CBN to meet their needs at all times. It is instructive to note that following a
deliberate policy since 1995 to allocate foreign exchange directly to end-users, as
well as the insistence on naira backing for all bids for foreign exchange, the demand
pressure has been significantly reduced. However, this should be interpreted with caution
because for reasons of documentation ~nd other motives, some market players still
patronize the parallel market (chart V).
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Chart V
Demand/Supply Gap
50
40
C

~

Demand

30

~

.E

z

Supply

20
10

'1986

'1988
'1987

'1990
'1989

'1992
'1991

'1994
'1996
'1998
'2000
'2002
'1993
'1995
'1997
'1999
'2001

4.3 Parallel Market Premium
The parallel market premium which averaged 160.0 per cent at the onset of SAP in
1986, narrowed to an average of 33.5 per cent in 1987-1990 indicating that the
misalignment of the exchange rate had been comparatively reduced. It, however, widened
to 54.6 per cent in 1991-1994 and thereafter the gap closed sharply to 2.8 per cent in
1995-1997, the only period it was within the tolerable limit of 5.0 per cent. In 200002, it averaged 11.9 per cent (chart VI). The large parallel premium in the foreign
exchange market can be traced to the inability of the official window to accommodate
all transactions that require foreign exchange. Other factors include; documentation
requirements and the tendency of authorized dealers to pursue cheap profits. The
continued existence and size of the parallel market which a study by the CBN and
Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) in 2001 put at US$592.4
million per annum or 8.2 per cent of total transactions at the official market (CBN/
NISER, 2001) remains worrisome. The parallel market had been a source of distortions
and the exchange rate sometimes drives the rate in the official market (as was the case
on March 5, 1992 when the naira was devalued to wipe out parallel market premium).
This fact was corroborated by the results of an empirical study by Nnanna (2002) that
" the parallel market rate is the lead indicator of the exchange rate" in Nigeria. The
persistent and large parallel market premium is indicative of the misalignment in the
exchange rate of the naira and has been destabilizing as it serves as an incentive for
authorized dealers to divert funds sourced from official sources to the parallel market
in pursuit of higher profit. Furthermore, it undermines the effectiveness of exchange
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rate in allocating scarce foreign exchange resources. This is because banks would rather
channel resources to transactions in the foreign exchange market with short gestation
periods and higher profit margin than the real sectors of the economy.
Chart VI
Parallel Market Premium
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4.4 Balance of Payments (BOP) Position
Available data indicated that, in general, the country's BOP position had been under
sustained pressure. The overall balance of payments only re9orded modest surpluses
of US$684.3, US$601.4,US$15.0 and US$221.0 million in 1990, 1991, 1997 and
2001, respectively, (see table 3). These reflected increased buoyancy of the merchandise
trade account as well as the deferment 9f some debt service payments falling due as
debt refinancing and rescheduling agreements were successfully concluded. The rest
of the period recorded deficits ranging from US$761.0 million to US$5,862.9 million
resulting mainly from deterioration of the current account.
4.5 Increase in Non-oil Expor~ through Diversification of Export Base.
The current account balance as a percentage of GDP which recorded an average deficit
of 4.3 per cent in the 1980-85, made an impressive tum around with a surplus of 3.4
per cent in 1986-1990. This was attributed to the sharp drop in the volume of imports
and the higher relative contribution of non-oil exports to total export (Olisadebe, 1991 ).
But following that initial jerk, it declined to a deficit of 1. 1 .and 1.5 per cent in
1991-95 and 1996-2001, respectively. This reflected the poor performance of the
manufacturing sub-sector as capaci~y utilization declined from 42.0 per cent in 1991
to an average level of 34.2 per cent in 1992 - 2001.
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The economy has continued to depend heavily on oil revenue, which accounted for an
average of 71.0 per cent of total foreign exchange inflows between 1988 and 2002.
Thus, diversification of the export base has remained a major target of exchange rate
policy since 1986. In pursuit of this, a number of incentives have been put in place to
encourage non-oil exports. However, the response has largely been unsatisfactory as
reflected in the low share of non-oil in total exports. From 5.7 per cent in 1986-90, it
fell to 2.6 and 2.1 per cent in 1991-95 and 1996-2001, respectively. In terms of
composition, non-oil exports recorded some modest success as hitherto relatively ·
unknown items such as Peugeot cars, asbestos, empty bottles and food items etc featured
in our export list at the initial period following SAP. This was, however, not sustained
due to the high import content of the manufactured goods coupled with the high cost of
production 'in the domestic economy, which made them uncompetitive in the
international market (see Chart VII).
Chart VII
Share of Non-oil in Total Exports
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4.6 Impact on the Economy
The nature of the Nigerian economy with virtually non-existent capital ·goods industry,
and a production base that is highly import dependent makes foreign exchange and in
effect, exchange rate policy crucial to the country's developmental efforts (Obadan
2002). Consequently, as a deliberate policy, the lion share of foreign exchange
allocation has been to the industrial and agricultural sectors, which constitute the real
sectors of the economy. Between 1986 and 2001, foreign exchange allocation to these
sectors averaged 51.9 per cent. Despite the huge allocation of foreign exchange to the
industrial sector, its contribution in terms of foreign exchange earnings as well as
capacity utilization has been quite low. From an average of 56.3 per cent in the five
years preceeding 1986, capacity utilization fell steadily to 34.5 per cent in
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1996-2001. Similarly, the contribution of the sector to GDP (6.0 per cent in 2001 for
manufacturing) and employment has not been commensurate. The performance of the
sector had been constrained by numerous problems, some of which include high cost
of operations resulting from failing social and economic infrastructure, strong
competition from imported goods, persistent depreciation of the naira exchange rate
and generally weak consumer demang ...
In the same vein, real GDP growth rate has been abysmal. Apart from the initial impact
following the introduction of SAP, which witnessed a real output growth from -4.0 per
cent in 1980-85 to 4.8 per cent in 1986-1990, the periods 1991-95 and 1996-2001
recorded modest growth rates of 2.8 and 3.3 per cent, respectively. The agricultural
sector has not fared any better having been bogged down with declining productivity.
The desired transformation from its current state to a market-oriented status needed to
give fillip to the industrial sector in the supply of raw materials was yet to occur. Thus;
the preferential allocation of foreign exchange to the productive sectors was yet to be
justified in terms of performance.
These developments particularly the unidirectional depreciation of the exchange rate,
have grave implications for the economy. As aptly captured by Obadan (2002), some
of these have manifested in:

•
•
•
•
•

decline in living standards as well as real value of output and assets;
increase in production cost arising from increased cost of imported inputs such
as machinery parts, equipment & raw materials and ultimately the level of inflation;
difficulty in planning and projections at the micro level;
uncertainties for long-term macroeconomic planning and growth; and
tendency for the international competitiveness of non-oil exports to be
undermined as a result of inflationary effect of depreciation.

From the foregoing analysis, exchange rate policy in Nigeria has not stood the test of
time. The underlying demand and supply conditions cannot be relied upon to bring
about an orderly movement in the exchange rate of the naira. Consequently, the exchange
rate has been characterized by volatility for most of the period. Also, under the scenario
of persistent supply constraint, the monetary authority relying more on demand
management initiatives, had to intervene in the market more often than it otherwise
should have. More worrisome was the nature of intervention which has been more of
frequent changes in operational guidelines as it had all along remained the major supplier
of foreign exchange to the market. It is hoped that as ongoing reforms of the economy
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with respect to privatization and the huge investments in the gas sub-sector begin to
bear fruits, the supply situation will improve with positive impact on the outcome of
exchange rate policy.

4. 7
The Way Forward
Exchange rate management in Nigeria has been quite challenging owing to the myriads
of problems identified earlier. However, these problems are by no means
insurmountable. Essentially, what is required is a realistic approach that is mindful of
the s~ength and structural weaknesses that are inherent in the economy but still anchored
on a deregulated framework. The rest of this section will highlight measures that would
reposition the economy on the path of attaining stated policy objectives. These are
articulated under supply, demand, exchange rate and other measures.
4.7.1

Supply Side Measures

4.7.1.1

Export of Food Crops

With the glut and falling commodity prices in the world market, it has become imperative
that we explore the vast potentials in the area of food crops. Nigeria has the highest
potential for the production of cassava in the world, which if properly harnessed, could
translate into an estimated inflow of US$ l .O billion annually. The same applies to yams
and a variety of other crops given the large population of Nigerians in foreign lands
following the unprecedented emigration since the downturn in the economy. In the
light of the above, the ban on export of food items and their derivatives should be
lifted. Although the ban contravenes the provisions of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to which the country is a signatory. For any country to remain relevant and
competitive in the present globalising environment, her international trade would have
to be anchored on commodities in which it enjoys comparative advantage. In any case,
these items still find their way out of the country illegally through neighbouring
countries, thereby denying the government revenue in taxes and repatriation of foreign
exchange proceeds due to the mode of exports. The argument of national food security
should be discarded, as any shock to the supply chain will only be temporary. The
resultant increment in prices will induce response by producers to restore supply in a
maximum of twelve months given the production cycle of these crops.
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4.7.1.2
Centralisation of Foreign Exchange Earnings
Foreign exchange earnings of all government parastatals should be centralized in the
CBN as against the current practice where they are held separately and made available
for intervention only after monetisation. This would broaden supply in the market and
ease demand pressure.
4. 7.2
Demand Management Measures
The CBN has initiated numerous measures to address the problem of excessive demand
for foreign exchange. These measures have been and would continue to remain mere
palliatives until the more fundamental issue of dependency on imported raw materials
is addressed. Statistics show that about 31.64 per cent of total foreign exchange
allocation to the industrial sector since 1988 was used for importation of industrial
raw materials. Past attempts at developing local substitutes for imported raw materials
have not made any meaningful impact due partly to the huge capital outlay required and
the long-term nature of such a programme. As a way out, the government in partnership
with the private sector should consider the establishment of a Venture Capital Fund for
research and development of alternatives to imported raw materials as well as the setting
up of domestic capital goods industry. Money from such a Fund would be made available
to private investors to take advantage of the giant strides made by the Raw Materials
Research and Development Council (RMRDC) in this regard. It is pertinent to mention
that the role of government in this direction should be limited to creating the enabling
environment. The private sector, particularly, the manufacturing concerns should be
compelled by legislation to set aside some portion of their earnings before tax to build
up the Fund which should be wholly managed by them.
Meanwhile, the current policy of rationalizing the structure of imports by the ban placed
on toothpicks, water and biscuits is quite commendable. However, instead of imposition
of outright ban, these items should be slammed with high tariffs, which will make local
substitutes more competitive. The list should also be reviewed to include other
non-essential imports such as fruit juice, fish, cement, rice, etc. The cases of fish, rice
and cement are particularly disturbing in view of the huge foreign exchange demand
•for their importation since the last quarter of 2002.
The manufacturing sector of the economy has for too long relied on official foreign
exchange to finance the off-shore component of its operations. Its contribution in
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terms of foreign exchange earnings has remained disproportionate compared with the
share of utilization. The priority status accorded the sector in foreign exchange
allocation may inadvertently be sustaining this trend. A fall-out of this policy of
'spoon-feeding' has been the lack of drive and initiative by manufacturing firms to
explore opportunities in the world market. While it would be appreciated that the need
to promote growth in the economy underpinned the Bank's stance, it has become
expedient to consider a phased withdrawal from funding the foreign exchange market
in the long run. To sensitize the market and prepare it for a smooth and orderly transition
towards independence, the CBN should occasionally 'closed shop' for a period ranging
between two weeks and one month and observe how the market reacts. It is expected
that there will be bubbles at the initial stages, but it is also expected that with careful
management by way of support especially, a focused implementation of the foreign
exchange related incentives to the manufacturing sector, the objective will endure.
Besides, this would be an added impetus to the marked improvement in inflows through
autonomous sources, which hopefully would rise to the challenge.

4. 7.3
Foreign Exchange Market Reforms
With the benefit of hindsight, we have come to appreciate the cumbersomeness and the
lack of professionalism inherent in the management of Retail DAS. We believe that
the time has come to introduce Wholesale DAS. The intermediation process and the
monetary policy transmission mechanism will function better if we allow banks to bid
for themselves and then sell foreign exchange to their customers. In the circumstance,
the CBN shall only contend with the demand of only 90 banks at most and about 48 on
the average on daily basis. A Wholesale DAS would not only help to minimize multiple
exchange rate system by encouraging convergence between the inter-bank rate and the
DAS marginal rate but would raise the consciousness of the operators to achieving a
stable exchange rate. Under a wholesale DAS, banks that hoard and speculate on foreign
exchange face a grave danger of losing money, if the DAS is managed proactively. In
the presence of excess domestic liquidity conditions, it is not possible to maintain the
same level of reserves without allowing the exchange rate to adjust under market
conditions. It is not realistic to control price and quantity at the same time. Allowing
the exchange rate to find its market level will reduce the parallel market premium,
check frivolous demand and act as instrument for mopping excess liquidity. For the
Wholesale DAS to work effectively, there is need for the CBN to be fully autonomous.
It is only in this way, that the CBN will be able tq adopt a non-accommodating monetary
policy that will help in stabilising exchange rate of the naira.
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4. 7.4

Other Measures

4. 7.4.1

Policy Environment

Exchange rate policies require conducive policy environment to be effective. Based
on past experiences, there is the compelling need for harmony between fiscal and
monetary policies. CBN should remain in the fore-front of the campaign to stem the
tendency of government at all levels to burst budgetary limits which filters into the
foreign exchange market to exert pressure on the naira exchange rate. A powerful lobby
should be set up to facilitate the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill before the
National Assembly, which seeks to limit government expenditure to its revenue. The
passage of this bill would be additional authority to the Bank and put it in a better stand
to ward off request for extra-budgetary financing beyond the statutory limit.

4.7.4.2

Incentives for Foreign Investments

Inflow of foreign exchange can also be boosted through effective promotion of foreign
investment inflows particularly, foreign direct investment. To this end, appropriate
incentives and policies must be guaranteed including efficient infrastructure, security
to life and property and an enduring political structure.

SECTIONV

5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The paper examined foreign exchange policy measures adopted since 1986. Prior to
this period, the economy faced serious crisis and was characterized by an over-valued
currency, low oil receipts, depleted external reserves and high import bills, emergence
of trade arrears and rapid accumulation of debts. The various measures adopted were
aimed at restructuring the economy and diversifying its revenue base, as well as achieving
a realistic exchange rate for the naira.
An appraisal of these exchange rate policies indicated that their impacts have been
mixed. The use of a flexible exchange rate had eliminated the over-valuation of the
naira. The parallel market premium has also been narrowed from about 60.0 per cent in
1986 to about 11.0 per cent in 2002. There was significant improvement in capacity
utilization and real output growth between 1986 and 1990. However, subsequent periods
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recorded less than satisfactory growth rates. The current account balance as a percentage
of GDP which recorded an average deficit of 4.3 per cent in the 1980-85, made an
impressive tum around with a plus of 3.4 per cent in 1986-1990. Thereafter, it declined
to a deficit of 1.1 and 1.5 per cent in 1991-95 and 1996-2001, respectively. In terms
of composition, non-oil exports recorded some modest success as hitherto relatively
unknown items such as Peugeot cars, asbestos, empty bottles and food items etc featured
in our export list at least at the initial period following SAP.
·
Inspite of all these policy measures the problems of exchange rate volatility, excessive
demand pressure in the foreign exchange market and the slow pace of export
diversification still persist. These were attributed to the weak and import dependent
production structure of the economy. Suggested policy actions were articulated towards
increasing foreign exchange inflows, reducing demand, as well as reforming the foreign
exchange market in order to evolve a more realistic exchange rate for the naira.

37

TABLE1
EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENT
(N/$)
Yea r

Officia l

P a ra llel

Bure aux De
C ha nge

Para llel
M a rk e t
Premium (%)

1986

2.0

0

4 .2

106.4

1987

4.0

0

5.6

3 8.1

1988

4.5

0

6. 1

33.4

1989

7.4

9.5

10.6

42.7

I 990

8.0

9.6

9.6

19 .6

199 1

9.9

12.8

13.4

35.2

1992

17.3

20.4

20.3

17 .4

1993

22. 1

36.1

36.2

64.3

1994

21.9

46.2

44 .1

101.5

1995

82.3

83.7

83.5

1.5

1996

81.5

83.2

83 .1

2.0

1997

82.0

85 .. 0

85.0

3.6

1998

84.4

88.1

87 .9

4.1

1999

92.7

99.3

99.2

7.0

2000

101.7

111.1

111.1

9 .2

2001

111.9

132.6

132 .4

18.3

2002

121.0

137.0

136.9

13 .1

Year

Premium
Average

1986 - 1994

50.95

1995 - 1998

2.80

1999 - 2002

11.90

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
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TABLE 2 .
FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEMAND AND SUPPLY
Year

Demand

Supply

.,

·"'·_,,;i.•....

'

Dev.%

1986

896.1

916.00

19.90

-2.22

1987

2,86.20

2,353.00

433.20

15.55

1988

3,259.90

2,910.00

349.90

10.73

1989

17,259.90

2,398.00

14,861.90

86.11

1990

20,196.90

2,501.60

17,695.00

87.61

1991

9,452.30

2,927.00

6,525.30

69.03

1992

6,452.30

4,045.70

2,388.90

37.13

1993

40,641.30

2,892.70

37,748.60

92.88

1994

35,691.30

1,961.10

33,730.20

94.51

1995

1,723.90

1,711 .70

12.20

0.71

1996

1,862.00

1,847.00

15.00

0.81

1997

2,939.50

2,939.50

1998

4,254.90

4,254.90

1999

4,880.30

4,880.30

2000

7,256.40

7,256.40

2001

9,658.60

9,658.60

2002

8,046.50

8,046.50

Note *September - December 1986
Source:

Abs. Dev.

Central Bank of Nigeria

-

-

TABLE 3
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS

Real GDP
Growth

Year

Industrial
Sector
Growth(%

Agric.
Sector
Geowth
(%)

Capacity
Utilisation

Current
Account

Overall BOP
Position

%GDP

($M)

(%)

Non-oiV
Total

Inflation
Rate

Growth
Rate of

(%)

(%)

M2
(%)

5.4

1.7

1986

3.2

3.5

7.7

38.8

-4.5

-3500.0

4.1

1987

0.5

18.0

8.0

40.4

-0.3

-4566.2

7.3

10.2

23.9

9.2

52.2

33.3

1988

9.9

14.5

-5.9

42.4

-0.8

-4621.1

1989

5.2

9.5

13.7

43.8

4.8

-3121.9

4.9

39.1

8.0

7.4

40.4

1990
1991

5.2
4.7

2.2
9.3

7.2

40.3

17.7

684.3

2.8

14.4

42.0

13.5

601.4

3.8

13.0

32.7
49.2

1992

3.0

2.6

7.7

38.1

-0.9

-5862.9

2.1

44.6

1993

2.7

-20.4

2.4

37.2

-2.8

-1893.1

2.3

57.2

49.8

1994

1.0

-0.8

-0.8

30.4

-5.7

-1947.5

2.6

57.0

39.1

-9.4

-2774.4

2.4

72.8

10.3

8.5

-761.0

1.8

29.3

16.8

15.0

2.3

8.5

16.9

1995

2.4

-5.5

3.4

29.3

1996

3.4

1.8

3.7

32.5

1997

3.2

1.4

4.6

30.4

1.2

1998

2.4

-4.8

3.1

32.4

4.1

-2873.0

4.5

10.0

23.3

-10.7

-3537.2

1.6

6.6

31.0

35.9

1999

2.8

-3.6

3.3

2000

3.8

7.6

3.1

36.1

-7.7

-3090.4

1.3

6.9

48.1

4.6

3.7

39.6

-4.1

221.0

1.3

18.9

12.2

-2.8

1.2

56.3

-4.3

3.2

2001

3.9

Year

1980 · 1985

Premium Average

-4.0

1986 · 1994

4.8

9.5

6.1

41.1

3.40

5.7

1995 · 1998

2.8

-~.o

5.4

C\J;,4

-1.10

2,6

1999 - 2002

3.3

1.2

3.6

34.5

-1.50

2.1

Source:

Central Bank of Nigeria
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TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE EXCHANGE RATES
Year

Nominal

Computed

Changes in

Diff. Between

Parallel

Exchange

PPP

Official

Comp. PPP

Market

Exchange Rate

and Nominal

Premium

Rate (Official)

(%)

1986

2 .0

5.91

55.9

3.9

106.4

1987

4.0

6.28

49.7

2.3

38.1

1988

4 .5

9.42

11.4

4.9

33.4

1989

7.4

13.51

38.6

6.1

42.7

1990

8.0

13.80

8.0

5.8

19.6

1991

9.9

14.91

18.9

5.0

35.2

1992

17.3

20.95

42.7

3.7

17.4

1993

22.1

32.00

21.6

9.9

64.3

1994

21 .9

48.95

-0.8

27.1

101.5

1995

82.3

82.33

73.4

0

1.5

1996

81.5

103.42

-1.0

21 .9

2.0

1997

82.0

109.69

0.6

27.7

3.6

1998

84.4

118.73

2.8

34.4

4.1

1999

92.7

123.24

8.9

30.6

7.0

2000

101.7

128.18

8.9

26.5

9.2

2001

111.9

151.0

9.2

39.1

18.3

2002

121.0

154.17

7.5

33.2

13.1

Year

Premium
Average

1986-1994

50.95

1995-1998

2 .8

1999-20002

11 .9

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
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